GrapheneOS

Robert Braxman has published another video spreading blatant misinformation about GrapheneOS in order to promote his highly insecure products and services. In addition to many false technical claims and fabrications about our team, he's falsely claiming the project is dying.

One of our two senior developers has been forcibly detained and conscripted to participate in a war. When they first went missing, we revoked their repository access as a precaution. We soon learned their disappearance was completely unrelated to GrapheneOS. Our priority has been keeping them safe.

A post from the developer of WireGuard on the severe security flaws and lack of trustworthiness of F-Droid:

https://gitlab.com/fdroid/fdroiddata/-/issues/3110#note_1613430404

This led to them including a self-update system which was openly implemented and documented. F-Droid was unaware they'd shipped it for half a year, and by then WireGuard had essentially escaped from in their words being held hostage by F-Droid.

This was a rare case where an app used developer signing keys via their flawed reproducible builds system. Most don't.

GrapheneOS fully supports the Private Space feature in Android 15, which is essentially a separate user nested inside of the Owner user.

We strongly recommend it as a replacement for a work profile managed by a local profile admin app. It has better OS integration and isolation.

There's a highly inaccurate article about Pixels from Cybernews making the rounds everywhere in privacy communities. It gets the details nearly completely wrong and thoroughly misrepresents things like the optional network-based location used nearly everywhere as Pixel specific.

Our Android 15 port is increasingly solid. It can currently be tested by building the OS via https://grapheneos.org/build. Since there aren't stable releases of Android 15 available yet, we currently support using the firmware, etc. from the Pixel Android 15 Beta releases for Pixels.

Wired was manipulated into spreading misinformation to market Palantir and iVerify by misrepresenting a vulnerability in a disabled demo app as being a serious problem which could be exploited in the real world. They should retract the article but won't.

https://wired.com/story/google-android-pixel-showcase-vulnerability/

Our latest release with prevention for most VPN app DNS leaks is currently available in our Alpha and Beta channels:

https://grapheneos.social/@GrapheneOS/112896412987587996

We need more feedback from testing VPN apps and services with leak blocking toggled on, which GrapheneOS already enables by default.

GrapheneOS App Store now includes a mirror of Accrescent, which is a privacy and security focused alternative to the Play Store distributing developer builds of apps:

https://accrescent.app/

Accrescent comes from within the GrapheneOS community and we're collaborating together.

We provide an official list of hardware requirements based on current generation devices:

https://grapheneos.org/faq#future-devices

These are the current hardware features we consider important enough to be listed as mandatory requirements. They're all current features, not planned/future ones.